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A B S T R A C T . “How do you define the term amateurism?” is a question I frequently ask my

students. Typical answers: “Non-professionals”, “Players who aren’t as good as professionals”,
with the most frequent reply being, “Athletes who do not get paid”. For most of the 20th century,
that is exactly what being termed an ‘amateur athlete’ meant for ‘non-professionals’ competing
in either international or college sponsored sporting events – participation without compensation.
But where did this interpretation originate? The word amateur derives from the Latin word,
amator or lover.1 The French derivation means ‘lover of’ and in all practicality means a person who
does something because he or she loves doing it.2 It would be logical, therefore, to believe that an
‘amateur athlete’ would then be someone who devotes his or her talents and skills for the love of
sport. But how did this concept develop into an ideology which prescribes that ‘amateurs’ should
not be financially rewarded for their dedication to their trade? And most importantly, why has this
interpretation been allowed to permeate into the sporting vernacular for upwards of a century
and a half to the financial detriment of the athletes who compete at the so-called ‘amateur’ level?
This article provides a historical overview of how, over the last 100 years or so, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) have consistently defined, redefined, and redefined again
the terms ‘amateur’ and ‘amateurism’ in ways that have allowed them, the governing body, to
profit substantially off their athletes’ skills and talents – commercially, financially, and otherwise.
It will then explore how the concepts have been weakened by recent litigation involving the NCAA
(O’Bannon and Alston), together with state-passed NIL laws, which are changing the narrative on
how amateur student-athletes can and should be compensated for competing at the college level.
A U T H O R . Professor Robert J. Romano is an Assistant Professor in the Division of Sport

Management at St. John’s University. After attending Springfield College, Professor Romano
obtained his Juris Doctorate from Loyola University School of Law in New Orleans, his Master’s in
Sports Management from Columbia University and his LL.M. in International and Comparative
Sports Law from Instituto Superior de Derecho y Economia (ISDE)/St. John’s University. Outside of
academia, Professor Romano is a Connecticut/New York based judicial arbitrator and attorney,
licensed in both state and federal court, whose legal practice focuses on sport law and sport and
entertainment related issues.

1

WORD SENSE DICTIONARY, https://www.wordsense.eu/amator (last visited July 23, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/W557-EWHS].
2

ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/amateur (last visited July
27, 2022) [https://perma.cc/QE6F-BDPY].

29

THE CONCEPT OF AMATEURISM: HOW THE TERM
BECAME PART OF THE COLLEGE SPORT VERNACULAR

I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF AMATEURISM .................................. 31

II. THE NCAA'S VERSION OF AMATEURISM ................................................ 32
III. CHALLENGING AMATEURISM AND THE FUTURE OF THE 'AMATEUR
ATHLETES' IN THE NCAA ....................................................................... 41
A. Ed O'Bannon v. The NCAA: The Federal District and Appeal Courts'
Rulings Regarding the NCAA's Concept of Amateurism ...................... 41
B. The NCAA v. Alston - The U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling Concerning
the NCAA's Concept of Amateurismf .................................................. 43
C. NIL Laws: Using the Legislative Branch to Dilute (Somewhat) the
NCAA's Concept of Amateurism ......................................................... 46
D. The National Labor Relations Board and the NCAA's Concept of
Amateurism ...................................................................................... 48
IV. IN CLOSING .......................................................................................... 50

30

UNH SPORTS LAW REVIEW

I.

Volume 1 (2022)

THE ORIGNS OF THE CONCEPT OF AMATEURISM

The Ancient Greek Olympic Games (776 B.C. – 393 A.D.) are often falsely
credited with creating this idea of amateurism as sporting competitions without
financial reward.3 However, during the time of the Greek Games, although winning
did not necessarily provide a monetary prize, an athlete did receive financial and
other rewards upon returning home to his city-state.4 An event winner could be
awarded upwards of 500 drachmae for his success at Mount Olympus, an amount
which equaled roughly three years wages for a common laborer.5 As Dr. Neil
Faulkner stated in his work, A Visitor’s Guide to the Ancient Olympic Games:
Ancient Olympic champions invariably became very rich men. They may have left
Olympia with only an olive crown, but they could expect ample reward for their efforts
at home, and they could earn generous prizes thereafter by appearing at any of some
hundreds of local sports festivals.6

Interestingly, “no reference to amateur athletes and no evidence that the
concept of amateurism was even known in antiquity… [T]he truth of the matter is
that ‘amateur’ is one thing for which the ancient Greeks never had a word.”7
The first use of the term ‘amateur’ in our modern vernacular occurred around
the year 1786, when an author for the publication entitled European Magazine
wrote, “Dr. Percival writes on philosophical subjects as an amateur rather than as a
master.”8 Yet nowhere was it mentioned that Dr. Percival’s skills, although less than
that of a master, should not be financially rewarded.9
By the mid to late 1800s, sport, being predominately an indulgence of the upper
and middle classes, routinely allowed for the exclusion of the lower-tiered, working

3

Brian Cronin, Were the Ancient Olympic Greek Athletes Really Amateurs?, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.latimes.com/sports/la-xpm-2012-mar-21-la-sp-sn-were-theancient-greek-olympic-athletes-really-amateurs-20120321-story.html [https://perma.cc/7AL3Q764].
4

Id.

5

James G. Thompson, The Intrusion of Corruption into Athletics: An Age-Old Problem, 38 THE
J. OF GEN. EDUC., 144, 146 (1986) (discusses compensation of Ancient Olympic Games).
6

Neil Faulkner, Olympic Myth #1 – The Amateur Ideal, YALE BOOKS (Apr. 23, 2012)
https://yalebooksblog.co.uk/2012/04/23/olympic-myth-1-the-amateur-ideal-author-article-byneil-faulkner [https://perma.cc/LCT2-L3KA].
7

Id.

8

L.A. Jennings, For the Love of Money: A History of Amateurism in the Olympic Games, VICE
(June 7,2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gvaqdm/for-love-or-for-money-a-history-ofamateurism-in-the-olympic-games [https://perma.cc/R37H-YD82].
9

Firstpost, 'The Amateurs Will Beat the Professionals': Mike Tyson Ridicules Idea to Have ProBoxing in Olympics, WWW.FIRSTPOST.COM, https://www.firstpost.com/sports/the-amateurs-willbeat-the-professionals-mike-tyson-ridicules-move-to-have-pro-boxing-in-olympics-2800460.html
(quoting former world-champion boxer Mike Tyson, who told reporters, "It's ridiculous, it's
foolish, and some of the pro fighters are going to get beaten by the amateurs.")
[https://perma.cc/G4FA-MA33].
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class, and people of color.10 This was because the notion of ‘classism’ was prevalent
and was used as a way to prevent the ‘common folk’ from mixing with the elite and
more sophisticated, but also because many believed that the lower classes had no
conception of sportsmanship and fair play.11
It was during the time when ‘learned individuals’ such as Dr. William Penny
Brookes12 were extoling the virtues of sporting men who were not compensated for
their athletic performance that this concept of ‘amateurism’ was created so that the
“lower orders and working people, together with people of color, would be excluded
from the play of the leisure class.”13 Therefore, the genesis of amateurism was built
around elitism and exclusion in that “those who performed manual labor for pay,
whether tied to sport or not, were considered professionals and therefore barred
from participating in various (amateur) competitions.”14 Another way to say that is
if a person did not have an independent source of income outside of actually
working, that is, if they were not independently wealthy, that individual would be
excluded from the amateur category.15
This original concept of amateurism came to be known as the ‘mechanics clause’
since a person would be denied amateur status if he or she were by trade or
employment a mechanic, artisan, or laborer.16 In all actuality this ‘mechanics clause’
was nothing more than a means of control and exclusion, disguised as a ‘moral
imperative for sport’, allowing the wealthy to regulate working and lower-class
people behind the screen of rhetorical morality.17
II. THE NCAA’S VERSION OF AMATEURISM

When Mark Emmert, President of the NCAA, was interviewed by Frontline in
February 2011, reporter Lowell Bergman didn’t pull any punches when he
presented, quite frankly, the new head of the country’s largest intercollegiate sport

10

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS DIGITAL COLLECTION, https://www.loc.gov/collections/america-at-work-andleisure-1894-to-1915/articles-and-essays/america-at-leisure (last visited July 23, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/3CSZ-KLRW].
11

See generally Steven A. Riess, From Pitch to Putt: Sport and Class in Anglo-American Sport, 21
J. OF SPORT HIST. 138, 140 (Summer 1994).
12

Ben
Johnson,
Much
Wenlock,
HISTORIC
UK,
https://www.historicuk.com/HistoryMagazine/DestinationsUK/MuchWenlock/#:~:text=Much%20Wenlock%20is%20h
ome%20to,Olympic%20Committee)%20visited%20the%20Games (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (citing
that Dr. William Penny Brookes was the founder of the Much Wenlock Olympian Games)
[https://perma.cc/GD2W-8CYP].
13

L.A. Jennings, supra note 8.

14

JULES BOYKOFF, POWER GAMES, A POLITICAL HIST. OF THE OLYMPICS 20 (2016).

15

ALAN GUTTMAN, THE OLYMPICS: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN GAMES 12-13 (2002).

16

D.C. YOUNG, THE MODERN OLYMPICS: A STRUGGLE FOR REVIVAL 40 (1996).

17

Boykoff, supra note 14, at 20.
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governing body with a series of issues and concerns surrounding the
commercialization of college athletics:
You don't see the contradiction that many have pointed out that when we're
watching March Madness, when we're watching these games, you may have a coach
who's being paid six figures, maybe seven figures in some cases. Everyone is being
paid – the athletic director, everyone you can see on the screen, and many people
you can't – are being paid as part of this, but the students aren't. The athletes who
are actually performing are not paid.”18
Unphased, the newly appointed and polished administrator’s reply was just as
direct: “No, I don't find that contradictory at all. Quite the contrary. I think what
would be utterly unacceptable is, in fact, to convert students into employees. The
point of March Madness, of the Men's Basketball Tournament, is the fact that it's
being played by students. We don't pay our student-athletes.”19 He then
commented that, “And our student-athletes remain student-athletes. And they are
preprofessional. They are not professional in anything.” 20
Not surprisingly, Mr. Emmert’s responses were in line with what the NCAA has
been selling to the American public since the early part of the twentieth century:
amateur college athletes are those that play sport purely for the enjoyment, without
being paid, as a way to develop his or her mental, physical, moral, and social skills.
In other words – participation without compensation. But is it true that athletes
were never compensated to compete in intercollegiate sports?
From its beginning, college athletics in the United States had a complex
relationship when it came to the concept of amateurism and how it intersects with
commercialization and the role that revenue plays within college sports. In what
many considered the first intercollegiate sporting event, a rowing regatta between
Yale and Harvard at Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire in 1852, the Elkins
Railroad Line sponsored the event while offering the competitors an all-expense
paid vacation with lavish prizes – along with unlimited alcohol.21
In truth, the ‘amateur athletes’ who competed in sports at the advent of
intercollegiate competition did receive various forms of compensation for their
efforts. As early as the 1870s, Syracuse University’s rowing team, with the help of a
professional, raced and won $400 in prize money.22 While at another intercollegiate
rowing regatta taking place at Lake Saratoga, New York, the winning crew team
there was awarded a silver goblet worth an estimated $500 (The average laborer’s

18

Interview by Dateline with Mark Emmert, President, NCAA (Feb. 14, 2011).

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Andrew Zimbalist, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALIZATION
SPORTS 7 (1999).
22

William Galpin, Syracuse University Press, 1:151-15 (1952).
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income during this time was approximately $300 annually.).23
Crew may have been in the lead initially, but football and baseball soon left
rowing (crew) in their wakes when it came to the securing various forms of athlete
compensation during the late 1800s. Three of the most noteworthy forms of athlete
compensation, in addition to prize money, were: i) an allowance from the schools
for professional training which including paying coaches, ii) the creation of the
athlete ‘training table’ for team building and better nutrition, and iii) the fashioning
of dorms to house athletes.24 As the captain of the 1890s Princeton football team
informed a prospective recruit, “You will find everything already provided for you in
the way of room, food, etc., which of course . . . will be of no personal expense to
you.”25 These costs were in no way insignificant, with the football training table in
1890s costing the Princeton University football team “over $2,500 out of a budget
of $16,000.”26
But the athletes were not the only ones to benefit from the interest surrounding
college sports. Colleges and universities across the United States leveraged sport to
attract attention to their school, resulting in increased revenue. This is evidenced by
the fact that the 1893 Thanksgiving Day football game between Princeton and Yale
attracted over 40,000 paying spectators,27 generating $26,000 in revenue,28 with the
Harvard and Yale game a year later, generating over $119,000.29
By the end of the nineteenth century, a rising concern grew within the halls of
academia for the need to control the economic excesses of intercollegiate athletics.
President Charles Eliot of Harvard University, concerned about the impact
commercialization was having on intercollegiate athletics, stated, “lofty gate
receipts from college athletics has turned amateur contests into major commercial
spectacles.”30 The same year, President Francis Walker of MIT bemoaned the fact
23

RONALD A. SMITH, THE MYTH OF THE AMATEUR: A HISTORY OF COLLEGE ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS, UNIVERSITY

OF TEXAS PRESS 45 (2022).
24

Id.

25

Garrett Cochran, Princeton Football Captain, to Francis Lane, Princeton University Archives,
(Aug. 20, 1896).
26
27

Princeton Football Financial Statements (1882-1893) (on file with Yale University Archives).

ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III,
BEHAVIOR 45 (1992).

ET AL.,

THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY

IN

CARTEL

28

Kavitha A. Davidson, The Ivy League Origins of Thanksgiving Football, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-11-26/the-ivy-leagueorigins-of-thanksgiving-football (showing that $313,297 in 2014 dollars as determined by the GDP
deflator) [https://perma.cc/R3JM-LJPZ]; See generally Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to
Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount – 1774 to Present, MEASURING WORTH (last
visited
July
27,
2022),
https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare
[https://perma.cc/3RTD-GL5V].
29

Sean Gregory, A Cut for College Athletes, TIME MAGAZINE, Sept. 16, 2013, at 36-42.

30

Rodney K. Smith, The Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n’s Death Penalty: How Educators Punish
Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 988-989 (1987).
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that intercollegiate athletics had lost its academic mooring and opined that ‘if the
movement shall continue at the same rate, it will soon be fairly a question whether
the letters B.A. stand more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics.”31 Alongside
the commercialization of college athletics was also the concerns revolving around
the safety of student athletes after the Chicago Tribune in 1904 reported that
college football witnessed the death of eighteen students and serious injuries to
almost two-hundred more.32
With this convergence of attention now being placed on intercollegiate
athletics, President Theodore Roosevelt called on university leaders to review
interscholastic athletic rules and safety regulations.33 In December 1905, the
Chancellor of New York University, Henry MacCracken, heeding the call of the
President, organized a meeting of thirteen institutions.34 This, and a series of other
meetings, led to a reform of intercollegiate athletics and the formation on March
31, 1906, of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS).35
The IAAUS’ main objective was to regulate collegiate sports to ensure player safety.
Four years later, in 1910, the IAAUS was renamed the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA).36
At its inception, the NCAA, organized primarily as a standard-setting body, did
not have the enforcement and revenue-producing responsibilities that it currently
has control over today. Its primary function, as was its predecessor, the IAAUS, was
that of a regulatory body whose purpose was to develop and standardize the rules
of the various intercollegiate sports for the safety of their participants.37 With the
changeover, however, the ‘new’ NCAA was granted the power to establish
amateurism as a core foundation for college athletics. Through its new-found
authority, the NCAA designated an amateur collegiate athlete as someone that
played sport purely for enjoyment and as a way to develop his or her mental,

31

Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games with the Reform of Big-Time
Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 567, 569-570 (1991).
32

Christopher Klein, How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, HISTORY.COM (July 21, 2019),
https://www.history.com/news/how-teddy-roosevelt-saved-football [https://perma.cc/G28QB4FD].
33

Katie Zezima, How Teddy Roosevelt Helped Save Football, WASHINGTON POST (May 29, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/teddy-roosevelt-helped-savefootball-with-a-white-house-meeting-in-1905/ [https://perma.cc/4D89-3FX5].
34

NCAA HISTORY, ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/4/history.aspx#:~:text=The%20NCAA%2C%20a%20
member-led,reputation%20as%20a%20brutal%20sport
(last
visited July
23, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/5VBG-VZCF].
35

Palmer E. Pierce, The Int'l Athletic Ass'n of the U.S.: Its Origin, Growth and Function, in 1907
PROC., supra note 2, at 28 (reflecting on the history of the IAAUS).
36

W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Nonprofit Org.
to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851, 874 (2002).
37

NCAA HISTORY, supra note 34.

35

THE CONCEPT OF AMATEURISM: HOW THE TERM
BECAME PART OF THE COLLEGE SPORT VERNACULAR

physical, moral, and social skills,38 admonishing that “no student shall represent a
college or university in any intercollegiate game or contest who is paid or receives,
directly or indirectly, any money or financial assistance.”39
The newly formed NCAA capacity to curb the commercialization, and to
establish the concept of amateurism as a core principle of college sports, however,
was less than successful. According to a Carnegie Foundation Report published in
1929, college athletics was still “sodden with the commercial and the material and
the vested interests that these forces have created.”40 As stated by Howard Savage,
when commenting on the Carnegie Report in American College Athletics, “schools
across the country sought to leverage sports to bring in revenue, attract attention,
boost enrollment, and raise money from alumni. The University of California’s
athletic revenue was over $480,000, while Harvard’s football revenue alone came in
at $429,000.”41 College football, he continued, was “not a student’s game”; it was
an “organized commercial enterprise” featuring athletes with “years of training,”
“professional coaches,” and competitions that were “highly profitable.”42
During the first half of the twentieth century, schools carried out whatever
measures necessary to monetize their individual athletic departments with the
objective of attracting talented athletes to their campuses.43 Desiring the best
players, the commercialization of college sports extended to the market for athletes,
with many colleges and universities actively and openly participating in a system
“under which boys are offered pecuniary and other inducements to enter a
particular college.”44 In 1939, it was alleged that the freshman at the University of
Pittsburgh would not participate in practice because the upperclassmen were
reportedly ‘earning more money’.45 And in the 1940s, University of Washington
halfback, Hugh McElhenny, allegedly became the first college player to ever take a
cut in salary by playing professional football46 when he was quoted saying “A
wealthy guy puts big bucks under my pillow every time I score a touchdown. Hell, I

38

ALLEN L. SACK AND ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE
NCAA'S AMATEUR MYTH PRAEGAR 35 (1998).
39

Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States Constitution By-Laws, Art. VII,
Section 3 (1906).
40

HOWARD J. SAVAGE, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 23 (1929).

41

Id. at 87.

42

Id. at viii.

43

EDUCATION
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1846/CollegeAthletics-HISTORY-ATHLETICS-IN-U-S-COLLEGES-UNIVERSITIES.html (last visited May 13, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/XE5X-YRHN].
44

Savage, supra note 40, at xiv-xv.

45

Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a New Tradition, 28 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 181, 190
(2017).
46

Zimbalist, supra note 21, at 22–23.
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can’t afford to graduate.”47
This free market for talent through athletic subsidies transitioned in the 1930s
into what has come to be known today as ‘grant-in-aid’ or ‘athletic scholarships’.48
This concept of an ‘athletic-scholarship’ was developed by schools lacking the
facilities and prestige to compete for recruits against the established powerhouses
in the Ivy League and Big Ten Conference.49 Lower-tiered, primarily southern schools
that could not attract athletes based upon their academic reputation would offer
recruits a ‘free education’ in return for their participation in athletics at their
institution.50
Needing a form of subsidy to level the playing field, in 1935 the Southeastern
Conference, a year after the NCAA called upon its member institutions to oppose all
subsidies to athletes (loans, scholarships, remission of fees or employment of
athletes), and only two weeks after the National Association of State Universities
banned athletic scholarships, voted 11-1 to openly accept athletic payments to
include tuition, fees, room, board, books, and laundry.51 The value of the scholarship
was approximately $760.00 per year broken down as follows: $200 for tuition, $355
for board, $90 for room, $44 for fees, $28 for books, and $45 for laundry.52
These concepts of athletic subsidies and scholarships went into overdrive after
the end of World War II when thousands upon thousands of soldiers, sailors, and
Marines returned from overseas. These war-veterans represented potential college
athletes and what followed was a “recruiting ‘free-for-all’, as athletic programs
looking to insert themselves into the scene of top-flight college athletics began
offering whatever financial inducements they could to incorporate this new talent
into their programs.”53 This ‘free-for-all’ fight for talent resulted in the NCAA’s
adoption of the so-called Sanity Code in 1948.54
This Sanity Code, while still reinstating the NCAA’s opposition to “pay in any
form”, did officially approve of the paying of an athlete’s tuition by member
institutions.55 The Sanity Code also created an enforcement mechanism for the
47

Crabb, supra note 45, at 211.

48

William C. Rhoden, Sports of The Times; The System of Awarding Scholarships to Athletes Is
Worth Saving, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/08/sports/sports-times-systemawarding-scholarships-athletes-worth-saving.html [https://perma.cc/JMB3-6KWJ].
49

WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 68 (1997).

50

Id.

51

Chicago Daily Tribune, 14 DECEMBER 1935 (Vanderbilt was the only SEC school that opposed
athletic scholarships with Sewanee abstaining).
52

Athletic Scholarships 1939-1940, Tulane University Archives.

53

Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarships Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures, 3 WM & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 203, 213 (2012) (effect of war veterans as potential recruits).
54

Colleges Adopt the ‘Sanity Code’ To Govern Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1948 [hereinafter
Colleges Adopt the 'Sanity Code'].
55

Sports Conflict Institute, The Sanity Code, SPORTSCONFLICT.ORG, https://sportsconflict.org/thesanity-code (last visited July 28, 2022) [https://perma.cc/PKB6-LNDC].
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NCAA which provided for the “suspension or expulsion” of “proven offenders.”56 To
some, these changes sought to substitute a consistent, above-board compensation
system for the varying under-the-table schemes that had long proliferated.57 To
others, the code marked “the beginning of the NCAA behaving as an effective
cartel,” by enabling its member schools to set and enforce “rules that limit the price
they have to pay for their inputs (mainly the ‘student-athletes’).”58
During the 1950s, the NCAA significantly increased its scope as both a rulemaking and regulatory body through the actions of newly appointed Executive
Director, Walter Byers. In the early part of this decade Byers and the NCAA
unilaterally granted itself broad sanctioning authority, while also creating the now
commonly referred to expression of “student-athlete” – emphasizing the fact that a
college athlete was a student first before being an athlete. Interestingly, and some
would argue manipulatively, referring to the athletes as ‘student-athletes’
discourages colleges and universities from treating them as professionals by
providing compensation beyond the NCAA regulated level, thus solidifying its
concept of the college athlete as an ‘amateur’.59
By 1956, in compounding its stance that all ‘student-athletes’ are amateurs, and
as an effort to respond to these aforementioned “illegal recruiting tactics” of the
southern colleges and universities, the NCAA created what was a previously
unknown concept, the four-year athletic scholarship.60 This four-year athletic
scholarship covered the cost of room and board, tuition, fees, books, and a $15 a
month cash allotment during the academic year.61 The NCAA conceded that this was
a form of payment but continued to call college athletes amateurs by reasoning “if
a player received only expenses, even though it was more than what other students
received, he or she was not being paid to perform.”62
However, the life span of the four-year athletic scholarship was short and a plan
to end the practice began in the early 1960s.63 Initially, the reason to end the
practice was based upon reducing costs and not about a student-athlete who quit a
team but continued to retain his or her guaranteed four-year scholarship. Sentiment
began to shift as the University of Oklahoma's Earl Sneed publicly expressed his
frustration with players who quit athletics but kept their scholarships.64 Sneed
56

Colleges Adopt the 'Sanity Code', supra note 54.

57

Zimbalist, supra note 21, at 10.

58

Id.

59
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contended that the four-year athletic scholarship made it difficult for coaches
because they were only allotted a certain number of scholarships per year.65 For
example, players who quit still held a percentage of a team’s allotted scholarships;
thus it made it difficult for a coach to field a competitive team. The NCAA initially
resisted pressures from college coaches and athletic directors and maintained its
position that a scholarship was for a ‘scholar’, a student first, and not for athletic
performance.66
It did not take long, however, for the NCAA to cave to the will of its membership
and in 1973, it eliminated the four-year athletic scholarships altogether, mandating
that schools could now only give scholarships on a one-year renewable basis.67 The
NCAA explained the move as a response to the costs associated with athletes who
would accept scholarships but fail to compete: “Member schools were uninterested
in spending money on athletes in the form of multi-year scholarships, only to have
those athletes quit their teams but keep the guaranteed education.”68 In 2012, the
NCAA modified its position on the one-year scholarships and now allows for, but did
not mandate, members to offer multi-year scholarships to student-athletes.69
From the 1970s forward, the NCAA, with the power it gained (or more
accurately, seized) during the 1950s under then Executive Director, Walter Byers,
and with the support of its member institutions, has initiated and enacted a series
of rules to further solidify its position regarding the concept of ‘amateurism’ and
that a ‘student-athlete’ is not entitled to compensation for his or her athletic skills
above that of an athletic scholarship.70
Once such rule requires that any prospective student-athletes enrolling for the
first time at a Division I or II school must register with the NCAA Eligibility Center
and receive an ‘amateurism certification’ before being allowed to compete. which
includes transfers from junior colleges, NAIA, international or Division III schools.71
By registering, future college athletes agree that they are amateurs and will only
compete as an amateur in accordance with NCAA Section 2.9, The Principle of
Amateurism, which states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental, and social
benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation,
65
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and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.72

Additionally, Article 12 of the NCAA Division I manual governs rules related to
an athlete’s continued eligibility as an amateur,73 with Section 12.1.2 detailing how
a student-athlete would lose his or her ‘amateur status’:
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) uses his or her athletic skill (directly
or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) accepts a promise of pay even if such
pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation; (c)
signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of
its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as permitted in Bylaw
12.2.5.1; (d) receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any
other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on
athletic skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e)
competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.12, even if no pay or
remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f)
after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft (see Bylaw
12.2.4); or (g) enters into an agreement with an agent.74

Since according to Section 12.1.2, an athlete will lose ‘amateur status’ if he or
she uses his or her athletic skill for pay in any form and the fact that an athletic
scholarship is a form of payment, the NCAA implemented, for the benefit of its
member institutions, Section 12.01.4 (emphasis added). This section provides an
exception for payments provided by member schools, reasoning that “grant-in-aid
administered by an educational institution is not considered to be pay or the
promise of pay for athletic skill, provided it does not exceed the financial aid
limitations set by the association's membership (emphasis added).”75
The NCAA, through the promulgation (and manipulation) of various rules and
by-laws, together with the utilization and promotion of terms such as ‘amateur’,
‘amateurism’, and ‘student-athlete’, has unilaterally decreed that anyone who
participates in athletics at the college level is not entitled to compensation above
that of a student-athlete scholarship offered by their institution.76 The NCAA sells
this to the public by proclaiming that amateur competition is a bedrock principle of
college athletics and that maintaining the concept of ‘amateurism’ is crucial in
preserving an academic environment in which acquiring a quality education is the
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first priority.77 The NCAA also maintains that through this college model, the young
men and women competing are students first, athletes second and that although
“amateurism” prevents athletes from claiming a salary, they still may receive a full
scholarship for their abilities.78
This is not to say that the NCAA has not at times revamped its rules and by-laws
when it comes to concept of the student-athlete and amateurism. In 1974, the NCAA
modified its rules to allow a paid professional in one sport – to compete on an
amateur basis in another.79 And again, some forty years after implementing the oneyear renewable scholarship, the NCAA announced that it would permit (not
mandate) “athletic conferences to allow their member schools to increase
scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.”80 The latter rule change being more
of a calculated move by the NCAA and its member institutions because of the federal
litigation surrounding former UCLA All-American basketball player, Ed O’Bannon.
I I I . C H A L L E N G I N G A M A T E U R I S M A N D T HE F U T U R E O F T H E ‘ A M A T E U R
ATHLETES’ IN THE NCAA

A. Ed O’Bannon v. The NCAA: The Federal District and Appeal Courts’
Rulings Regarding the NCAA’s Concept of Amateurism

One of the first noteworthy legal challenges to the NCAA’s longstanding
concepts of ‘amateurism’ and the ‘amateur athlete’ was in 2009 when former UCLA
All-American basketball player, College Player of the Year, and 1995 NCAA Men’s
College Basketball Champion, Ed O’Bannon, sued the NCAA and EA Sports.81
O’Bannon’s lawsuit came about after he became aware, when a friend’s son
recognized him from a video game, that the game’s number 31 ‘player avatar’
representing his 1995 UCLA men’s basketball team not only resembled him, but also
shared the same jersey number, was similar in skin tone, height and weight, and
played the same position.82 Believing the NCAA engaged in illegal and exploitative
practices through its selling of his image and likeness to EA Sports, the game’s
developer, O’Bannon filed a federal antitrust and right of publicity lawsuit against
both the NCAA and the video game company.83 As detailed in his complaint,
O’Bannon alleged that the NCAA’s licensing of his image to EA Sports was unlawful
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since he neither gave his consent, nor did he share in any of the profits that both
the NCAA and EA Sports secured from the sales of the video game.84
The NCAA defended itself against the federal antitrust claims by arguing that its
long-standing definition of amateurism, supported by the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court
case of NCAA vs. Board of Regents, shielded it from any liability,85 and that the strict
price cap it places on a college player’s value (the cost of the student-athletes
scholarship) is necessary to maintain competitive balance throughout its member
institutions.86 As for right of publicity claim, the NCAA asserted that Mr. O’Bannon,
and those similarly situated, waived any right to assert this cause of action since its
bylaws, of which all NCAA student-athletes signed off on, prohibit them from
receiving compensation from the sale of their name, image, or likeness.87
In previous litigation concerning these legal issues, when the NCAA mentioned
‘amateurism’ or the ‘amateur athlete’, that predictably ended any arguments about
student-athlete compensation. But in O’Bannon, the District Court announced that
the NCAA now needed to prove how its current version of amateurism “actually
contributes to the integration of education and athletics,”88 stating that “It [the
NCAA] cannot just tautologically argue that not paying the players is necessary to
preserve the principle that the players are unpaid.89
Not persuaded by any of its arguments, the District Court rejected the NCAA’s
‘longstanding commitment to amateurism’ as an acceptable defense against
antitrust liability, finding instead that the NCAA’s definition of amateurism “is
‘malleable,’ ‘changing frequently over time’ and in ‘significant and contradictory
ways.’”90 The District Court, on August 8, 2014, then issued an injunction against the
NCAA and ordered it to permit its member institutions to allot “up to $5,000 in
deferred compensation” for the players’ names, images, and likenesses, holding the
funds in trust until they leave school.91
The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit agreed, in part, with the District
Court, finding, as per its September 30, 2015 decision, that the NCAA is not above
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antitrust law and that courts cannot and must not shy away from requiring the NCAA
to play by the Sherman Act’s rules.92 The U.S. Appeals Court continued, stating that,
“In this case, the NCAA's rules have been more restrictive than necessary to
maintain its tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports market.”93
However, regarding the District Court’s order for the NCAA to permit its
member institutions to allocate “up to $5,000 in deferred compensation”, the
Appeals Court found that the “NCAA is only required to allow its schools to provide
up to cost of attendance to their student-athletes. It does not require more.”94 And
with that “It does not require more” statement, the Appeals Court reversed the
District Court’s ruling which allow student-athletes to be compensated up to $5,000
upon leaving their college or university.95
While the O’Bannon Courts’ decisions did not ultimately allow a student-athlete
to be compensated for his or her name, image, or likeness or for what has been
termed ‘pay to play’, nor did they result in the NCAA changing its position regarding
‘amateurism’ or the ‘amateur athlete’.96 What the decisions did do, however, was
provide an important departure from prior federal court holdings that protected the
NCAA from antitrust liability.97 This departure will open up the door to future
litigants and will allow them the right to argue that these concepts ‘amateurism’ and
the ‘amateur athlete’ do indeed violate federal antitrust laws. In addition, and very
significantly, what O’Bannon did was create a framework artfully and subtly for the
subsequent state NIL laws that allow student-athletes to receive some form of
compensation through the sale of their name, image, or likeness.
B. The NCAA v. Alston – The U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling Concerning the
NCAA’s Concept of Amateurism

The second noteworthy lawsuit testing the NCAA’s longstanding concepts of
‘amateurism’ and the ‘amateur athlete’ is the U.S. Supreme Court case of NCAA v.
Alston.98 In 2014, current and former student-athletes in men’s Division I FBS
football and men’s and women’s Division I basketball filed a class-action federal
antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA and eleven Division I conferences challenging the
“current, interconnected set of NCAA rules that limit the compensation that they
92
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may receive in exchange for their athletic services.”99
The NCAA, defending itself in yet another antitrust matter, again attempted to
persuade the federal courts that the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court case of NCAA v. Board
of Regents’ finding that “the NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports,”100 was applicable, arguing that
the uniqueness of its product, the status of student-athletes as amateurs, requires
antitrust deference if not total immunity.101
Not persuaded by its plea for antitrust protection, the U.S. Supreme Court, on
June 21, 2021, in a unanimous decision, upheld the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling which found that the placing of limits on a student-athletes’
educational-related compensation by the NCAA was a violation of federal antitrust
law, specifically Section 1 of the Sherman Act which prohibits any “contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”102
Writing on behalf of his colleagues, Justice Gorsuch stated that the Court’s
decision was based on the fact that the business of college sports has changed
considerably since the 1984 Board of Regents’ case and that over the decades the
NCAA has become a sprawling enterprise consisting of approximately 1,100 colleges
and universities.103 Justice Gorsuch remarked that since the Board of Regents
decision, the NCAA’s broadcasting rights fees to March Madness104 have grown from
$16 million in 1984, to $1.1 billion in 2016.105 The Court also noted that the current
broadcasting fees for the FBS College Football Playoff series are worth
approximately $470 million annually for the NCAA and its member institutions and
that in addition to this amount, the Division I conferences earn substantial revenue
from regular season games.106 As an example, Justice Gorsuch highlighted that the
Southeastern Conference alone “made more than $409 million in revenues from
television contracts in 2017, with its total conference revenues exceeding $650
99
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million that year.”107
Justice Gorsuch underscored this detail by recognizing that while studentathletes’ compensation is limited by the NCAA to that of the value of a scholarship,
those who run ‘this enterprise’ profit significantly.108 In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch
noted that the president of the NCAA, Mark Emmert, earns nearly $4 million per
year, the Commissioners of the top college conferences earn between $2 to $5
million, college athletic directors average more than $1 million annually, and the
annual salaries for top Division I college football coaches approach $11 million, with
some of their assistants making more than $2.5 million.109
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring with his colleagues in a separate opinion, was
also critical of the NCAA’s century-long argument that compensation restrictions are
necessary to separate amateurs from professionals, stating, “[b]usinesses like the
NCAA cannot avoid the consequences of price-fixing labor by incorporating pricefixed labor into the definition of the product.”110 He continued, commenting that
“nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their
workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying
their workers a fair market rate . . . The NCAA is not above the law.”111
Consequently, as a result of the continued commercialization of college
athletics and the increased revenue it generates, the U.S. Supreme Court in Alston
determined that the NCAA can no longer mandate its member schools to limit
athletic scholarships to that of tuition, fees, room, board, books, and other expenses
up to the value of the full cost of attendance.112 Now, the Supreme Court concluded,
the NCAA must allow its member institutions to reimburse student-athletes for
expenses pertaining to other education-related benefits such as computers,
equipment, and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance
calculation.113
The legal significance of Alston is that in future legal matters involving both the
NCAA and federal antitrust laws, since the NCAA has become a massive, powerful,
and as some would argue, ruthless commercial ‘enterprise’, it will no longer receive
the special judicial dispensation on issues concerning student-athlete compensation
that it had previously.114 In addition, even with its limited holding, the Alston matter
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will serve as the ‘catalyst for change’ that litigants will argue to further dismantle
the NCAA’s views on ‘amateurism’ and the ‘amateur athlete’.115 A change that in
many respects has already begun through the various state laws involving name,
image, and likeness, together with the pending legal cases dealing with the
employment status of student-athletes.
C. NIL Laws: Using the Legislative Branch to Dilute (Somewhat) the NCAA’s
Concept of Amateurism

After analyzing the significance and likely legal ramifications of the holdings in
both O’Bannon and Alston and the impact that they may have on intercollegiate
sports, the NCAA’s concepts of ‘amateur athletes’ and ‘amateurism’ changed ever
so slightly on June 30, 2021. On that date, the NCAA, as various state laws were
scheduled to go into effect, implemented rule changes that would, in principle,
permit student-athletes to monetize their name, image and likeness (NIL) without
the fear of losing either their scholarship or athletic eligibility.116
Although the NCAA did not officially adopt its own rule(s) allowing studentathletes to monetize their NIL, what it did was to approve of an ‘interim policy’
suspending any and all current NCAA name, image, and likeness regulations for all
incoming and current student-athletes in all sports.117 The NCAA’s specific ‘policy’
states that “if a student-athlete elects to engage in NIL activity that is consistent with
and protected by a valid and enforceable law of the state in which the institution at
which such individual enrolls is located, the individual’s eligibility for intercollegiate
athletics will not be impacted by application of Bylaw 12.”118 What the NCAA is
saying is, ‘yes, student-athlete – you can abide by the law of your state, if they have
one, without subjecting yourself to punishment or other ramifications being
enforced by the NCAA’.119
For those states which have not enacted NIL legislation, the NCAA is leaving it
up to either the conferences or the individual colleges and universities to devise a
policy, stating that “even if a student-athlete elects to engage in NIL activity and is
enrolled at an institution in a state without effective NIL laws, the individual’s
eligibility for intercollegiate athletics will not be impacted by application of Bylaw
12.”120
On its face it appears as if the NCAA’s ‘non-position’ on the NIL issue is a
meaningful departure from its time-honored proposition, that a college athlete is
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someone who participates purely for the enjoyment of the game while forgoing any
money or financial assistance above the value of a student-athlete scholarship.121
However, the NCAA’s act of not initiating its own formal policy may be deliberate,
and somewhat strategic, because what is left is a complicated and confusing system
based on different laws and rules for different student-athletes depending on where
their college or university is located.122 Sitting idly by and allowing state legislatures
to enact various and varied laws was beneficial to the NCAA’s pretense of
amateurism since most of the state’s NIL legislation placed some form of limitation
on what type of ‘deals’ student-athletes can enter into with a brand or company.123
For example, some states allow a student-athlete to use his or her college’s logo
and team colors in promotional deals; other states prohibit that.124 Some state’s
universities can broker NIL deals for athletes; other states bar schools from that
role.125 Specifically, Illinois’ NIL law includes a ‘market cap’ that limits what a
student-athlete can earn; it doesn’t allow NIL deals for recruits who sign with
colleges until they enroll or start mandatory sports participation; and it doesn’t
allow NIL deals that continue after an athlete transfers.126 While California’s Fair
Play to Pay Act bans student-athletes from entering into agreements with brands or
companies that conflict with their college’s or university’s sponsorship, media, or
endorsement deals or with the image or mission of the school.127
These inconsistencies, overlaps, and possible contradictions, lead to disparities
and inequities on how student-athletes can capitalize on their right of publicity, and
may, in some instances, lead to a ‘chilling effect’ wherein a student-athlete passes
on an opportunity for fear of violating one of these confusing laws or rules.128 In
essence, by allowing the states to take the lead in this area, the NCAA protected its
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ideals of ‘amateurism’ and the ‘amateur athletes’ since in doing so, it “slyly
rebalanced the student-athletes’ newfound bargaining freedoms back in favor of the
colleges and universities.”129
D. The National Labor Relations Board and the NCAA’s Concept of
Amateurism

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Regional Office in Chicago, after a
petition was filed by then Northwestern University quarterback Kain Colter on
January 28, 2014, determined that members of the university’s football team who
received academic scholarships were to be considered “employees” within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore, have the right to
form a labor union.130 The NLRB based its findings on the following:
The University’s football program generated revenues of approximately $235 million
between 2003 and 2012, such that the players performed valuable services for the
University.
The players were “compensated” via scholarships equal in value of up to $76,000 per
year.
The players are engaged in football activities all year-round and devote between 40-50
hours a week to football activities during many months, which is often more time than
they devote to academics.
The football coaching staff exerted incredible control over the players, not only requiring
them to practice and attend meetings on a rigid schedule throughout the day but also
requiring them to seek some type of approval before they could make living
arrangements, apply for employment, purchase vehicles, travel off campus, post items
on social media forums, and speak to the media.131

Northwestern University, unquestionably at the urging of the NCAA and its
member institutions, appealed the decision of the Regional Office to the full
National Labor Relations Board in Washington, D.C. The D.C. Office, in August 2015,
dismissed Colter’s petition.132 In its decision, the NLRB didn’t rule on the merits, but
instead declined to exert jurisdiction of the matter and therefore, by not doing so,
preserved one of the NCAA’s core principles: that college athletes are students
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subject to its rules regarding amateurism. However, the NLRB’s D.C. Office never
determined whether or not the players are employees, instead it found that the
novelty of the petition and its potentially wide-ranging impacts on college sports
would not have promoted “stability in labor relations.”133 As stated in its decision,
“The Board has never before been asked to assert jurisdiction in a case involving
college football players, or college athletes of any kind. Even if scholarship players
were regarded as analogous to players for professional sports teams who are
considered employees for purposes of collective bargaining, such bargaining has
never involved a bargaining unit consisting of a single team’s players.”134
But that was the decision of the NLRB in 2015. Since then, the U.S. Appeals Court
for the Ninth District ruled in O’Bannon, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Alston, and
a number of state legislatures enacted rules regarding a college athlete’s right to
profit from her or his NIL.135 As a result of these changes regarding the concepts of
‘amateurism’ and the ‘amateur athlete’, on September 29, 2021, NLRB General
Counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo issued an ‘updated’ memorandum which solidified the
NLRB’s current position and stated, unequivocally, that now ‘certain’ “Players at
Academic Institutions (sometimes referred to as student athletes), are employees
under the National Labor Relations Act, and, as such, are afforded any and all
statutory protections (emphasis added).”136
Specifically, the updated NLRB memo states that –
Players at Academic Institutions perform services for institutions in return for
compensation and subject to their control. Thus, the broad language of Section 2(3) of
the Act, the policies underlying the NLRA, Board law, and the common law fully support
the conclusion that certain Players at Academic Institutions are statutory employees,
who have the right to act collectively to improve their terms and conditions of
employment.137

In addition to finding that certain players at academic institutions are statutory
employees, the NLRB warned colleges and universities that classifying players as
‘student-athletes’ leads to those players believing that they are not employees and
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can ‘chill’ an employee’s rights.138 In light of this, the NLRB announced that, in
appropriate cases, it will “pursue an independent violation when a college or
university misclassifies players at academic institutions as student-athletes.”139
Even with the NLRB’s updated memo and redefinition of a student-athlete as an
employee, important legal questions remain. These include whether or not the
NLRB will expand ‘employee’ protections and the right for student-athletes to
unionize to include; i) all scholarship and non-scholarship athletes, ii) athletes
competing in both men’s and women’s sports, iii) athletes playing in both revenue
and non-revenue sports, iv) athletes participating at both private and public colleges
and universities, v) international student-athletes in the United States attending
college and competing on an F-1 student visa, and vi) non-NCAA member
institutions who compete in associations such as the NAIA or NJCCA.140
Some of these questions may be answered soon though, because on August 25,
2021, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the
NCAA’s motion to dismiss the case of Johnson v. NCAA, a lawsuit brought by a
number of college athletes from various universities asking the court to find that
they are employees of their athletic programs and therefore entitled to be paid for
their services.141 With the denial of the motion to dismiss, this case will proceed
forward – to what end and as to what, if any, questions it may answer, we shall have
to wait and see.
IV. IN CLOSING

The concepts of the ‘amateur athlete’ and ‘amateurism’ as defined by the NCAA
come from Victorian Era England. Specifically, the British elite who enjoyed rowing,
winning, and keeping the unwashed, day-laboring masses at arm's length.142
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“Amateurism really started when the people who were rowing boats on the Thames
for a living started beating all the rich British aristocrats,” Olympic historian Bill
Mallon said. “That wasn't right. So, they started a concept of amateurism that didn't
exist in ancient Greece.”143
Fast-forward a couple hundred years, several antitrust lawsuits, a number of
enacted state laws, and an NLRB memo later and it’s finally being acknowledged
that the contradiction and illogicality of not paying the athletes whose talents and
skills are the catalyst that drives a billion-dollar industry is unfair, unjust, and
inequitable. A contradiction that Lowell Bergman highlighted in the Frontline
documentary wherein when the American public is watching March Madness, a
sporting event that generates over $900,000,000.00 annually for the NCAA, . . . the
coaches are being paid, the athletic directors and administrators are being paid,
everyone associated with the event is being paid, but the student-athletes aren't144
– seems to, ever so slowly, be changing. And with that, the concepts of ‘amateur
athlete’ and ‘amateurism’ being defined as participation without compensation may
finally come to an end.
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